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Abstract: This paper identifies the motives for selling convertible bonds with a higher‑than‑aver‑
age initial conversion premium, using a sample of 300 convertible debt issues carried out between 
2004 and 2014 by manufacturing and service companies from the United States, Europe and Asia. 
Empirical analysis indicates that high premium convertibles are issued by strongly undervalued com‑
panies with poor financial performance, looking to increase their equity capital through the back‑
door, under more favorable conditions in comparison to the issuance of common stock. For this rea‑
son, convertibles designed in this way are likely to be perceived by firms as a delayed equity rather 
than a debt sweetener.
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1. Introduction
Convertible bonds are the most popular hybrid financial instruments used by firms 
across the world. The motives for using convertibles have been examined since the 
1950s. Most of them are based on asymmetric information and agency conflicts 
framework. According to the researchers, hybrid debt may be used by companies 
to eliminate adverse selection problems resulting from information asymmetry 
between firms and investors (Brennan, Schwartz, 1988; Stein, 1992); to mitigate 
agency conflicts between shareholders, bondholders and managers (Green, 1984; 
Isagawa, 2000); and to finance multi‑stage investment projects (Mayers, 1998).
A success of convertible debt financing depends largely on a pre‑arranged 
conversion price – that is, the price at which bondholders have the right to take 
up a certain number of the issuer’s shares if they decide to exercise a conversion 
option embedded in convertible bonds. Usually it is settled at about 15–25% above 
the company’s share price at the moment of convertibles issuance (Das, 2001). This 
is the so‑called “initial conversion premium”. Bondholders decide to convert debt 
into equity if a conversion option is in‑the‑money, meaning any time during a con‑
version period an issuer’s stock price exceeds a predetermined conversion price. 
A conversion of debt means that a company increases its equity capital “through 
the backdoor” (Stein, 1992) at a certain moment after debt issuance, at a higher 
price and at a lower dilution, since in order to raise the desired amount of funds, 
a firm issues a fewer number of shares.
Sometimes convertible debt is issued with a higher‑than‑average conver‑
sion premium (about 30–80%). One can interpret this decision in two ways. First, 
by doing this, managers may incite bondholders to refrain from converting debt 
into equity. This strategy is perhaps aimed at raising cheaper external financing 
in comparison to straight debt without interfering in shareholders structure, since 
a conversion option is unlikely to become in‑the‑money during a conversion period 
(Brennan, Schwartz, 1988). Note that due to a conversion option attached to con‑
vertible bonds, bondholders usually accept a lower coupon compared to ordinary 
debt. A similar effect can be achieved by issuing convertibles when companies are 
overvalued, as it is highly probable that bonds remain out‑of‑the‑money until ma‑
turity. Secondly, in contrast to the above, managers can issue high premium con‑
vertibles when they consider their firms to be strongly undervalued. By doing this, 
they envisage an increase of equity capital at a later time under more favorable 
conditions as a result of conversion of debt into common stock. Hence, the issu‑
ance of hybrid debt may constitute a credible signal for the market that managers 
anticipate a significant increase of firm’s share price, which will end in exercis‑
ing a conversion option by bondholders (Stein, 1992). Despite a key role of initial 
conversion premium in hybrid debt financing, this issue has been examined very 
rarely thus far. Apart from the observations of market practice, where an average 
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premium usually amounts to 15–25%, it is still unclear why some companies de‑
cide to fix a relatively high conversion price in relation to their share price at the 
moment of convertibles issuance while others settle for a very low premium. An‑
swering this question is the main point of this article. To put it more simply, the 
aim of this paper is to identify the motives for the issuance of convertibles with 
a relatively high conversion premium and to verify whether these instruments serve 
companies as a substitute for equity or as an alternative for straight debt. Moreo‑
ver, the analysis has been performed among issuers from different geographical 
locations to check whether the reasons for issuing high premium convertibles vary 
across different hybrid debt markets.
It seems that the idea employed by overvalued companies to issue convertible 
bonds as a sort of cheap debt raises strong doubts. It is simply possible that CFOs 
underestimate future levels of companies’ revenues and, contrary to their initial 
prediction, a conversion option eventually becomes in‑the‑money, which usually 
ends in converting debt into equity. To minimize this risk, managers can set a rel‑
atively higher conversion price, but this may be interpreted as an action against 
the interest of shareholders. In theory, an overvalued company should issue or‑
dinary shares and sell them at a higher price, rather than carry out an issuance 
of debt instruments (Brennan, Schwartz, 1988). Actually, firms usually do not pro‑
ceed this way for two reasons. First, CFOs may not be willing to bear an excessive 
cost of selling common stock in the public market (Brown et al., 2012). Secondly, 
as Lee and Loughran (1998) noticed, one in three companies issues equity within 
two years before hybrid debt offerings. Another stock issuance may be read by in‑
vestors as a further attempt to sell overvalued equity, which can result in reduced 
demand for newly issued shares.
If, then, the issuance of convertible bonds as a source of cheap debt bears a risk 
of unwanted conversion, one should consider issuing convertibles as an alternative 
of common stock. In this regard, managers decide to issue hybrid debt to increase 
equity capital “through the backdoor” by giving bondholders a right to convert 
bonds into certain number of a company’s shares in the future (Stein, 1992). The 
success of this strategy strongly depends on whether a conversion option becomes 
in‑the‑money during a conversion period. The issuers should then sell hybrid debt 
when they are undervalued and wait until their stock price exceeds a pre‑deter‑
mined conversion price. Settling a higher‑than‑average conversion premium (ca. 
40–80%) may constitute a signal to the market that a firm is deeply undervalued 
and that managers tend to sell new shares later on at a higher price through a debt 
conversion. Thereby, it can be assumed that convertible bonds with a high con‑
version premium may be used by firms mainly as a deferred equity, not as a debt 
sweetener. While a company does considerably reduce its costs of debt service 
by choosing this source of financing, it does not seem to be its primary purpose. 
In light of these considerations, the main hypothesis of this paper is as follows: con‑
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vertible bonds with a high initial conversion premium are issued by firms as an al‑
ternative for common stock, rather than a substitute for straight debt.
The final sample used in the research comprises three hundred issues 
of straight, callable and putable convertibles carried out by manufacturing and 
service companies from the United States, France, Germany, Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, China, Japan and Hong Kong between 2004 and 2014. The verifica‑
tion of the stated hypothesis was undertaken through an analysis of ten proxies for 
companies’ leverage, liquidity, profitability, investment opportunities and by the 
cost of raising capital using descriptive statistics, statistical significance tests and 
logistic regression models.
The remainder of this article expands as follows: Section 1 provides a brief 
literature review on motives for issuing convertible bonds and the role of initial 
conversion premium in hybrid debt financing. Section 2 describes the sample de‑
scription and methodology. Section 3 sets forth the research results and discus‑
sion of key findings.
2. Literature review
According to Stein (1992), using convertible bonds may be profitable for com‑
panies that are willing to keep off raising capital, either through stock issuance 
(due to a high level of information asymmetry between a firm and the market) 
or through issuing straight debt (to avoid problems with repaying debt obligations 
toward bondholders). The risk of selling undervalued stock is particularly high for 
firms whose financial results and investment opportunities are difficult to antici‑
pate by the market (young and small firms, for instance). As a consequence, they 
would raise less capital and have to forego profitable investment options, which 
is known as an adverse selection problem first formulated by Akerlof (1970). The 
issuance of straight debt usually leads to similar constraints. A higher coupon 
of newly issued bonds may drive companies into liquidity troubles and difficulties 
with redeeming debt at maturity. Stein suggests that using convertible bonds can 
help firms solve this two‑fold problem. He argues that a construction of hybrid debt 
allows firms to increase equity capital “through the backdoor” while avoiding re‑
demption of bonds and bearing lower costs of interests compared to straight debt. 
For that reason, Stein asserts that by issuing convertibles, companies can signal 
their good future financial performance as they demonstrate to the market their 
belief that converting debt into equity is highly probable.
However, not all research findings support Stein’s viewpoint. First, the an‑
nouncement effect of offering convertibles is usually negative in most markets 
(Kim, Stulz, 1992; Ammann, Fehr, Seiz, 2006; Dutordoir, Van de Gucht, 2007). 
This can be explained on the grounds of the pecking order theory of Mayers and 
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Majluf (1984). Consistent with this concept, firms tend to issue common stock 
when they are overvalued, which is met with current shareholders’ response, who 
start to get rid of their shares. For a similar reason, the issuance of convertible debt 
may be interpreted by investors as a company’s attempt to sell overvalued com‑
mon stock “through the backdoor.” In support of this supposition, Lee and Lough‑
ran (1998) as well as Spiess and Affleck‑Graves (1999) showed that the stock price 
of convertible bonds issuers underperforms in the long run.
Another potential motive for using convertible debt was observed by Lew‑
is, Rogalski and Seward (2001). They attribute the firms’ decision to issue con‑
vertibles to their limited access to the equity market. This view is close to that 
of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), where lenders are unwilling to provide funds to the 
borrowers if they consider the costs of adverse selection as too high. This situa‑
tion urges companies to use hybrid debt securities which can be transformed into 
equity capital thereafter.
Bringing the considerations of Stein (1992) and Lewis, Rogalski and Seward 
(2001) together, it can be assumed that companies perceive convertibles primarily 
as a delayed equity which enables them to avoid issuing undervalued shares and 
helps them raise equity capital at a later time under more favorable conditions. Al‑
though Brennan and Schwartz (1988) suggest that several firms can also use con‑
vertible bonds as a debt sweetener (overvalued companies in particular), no one 
can assure that a conversion option will remain out‑of‑the‑money until maturity 
and bondholders resign from converting debt into equity. Thus, it is probable that 
using high premium convertible debt is aimed more at increasing equity capital 
through the backdoor rather than at protecting managers from miscalculating a fu‑
ture market capitalization of a company, which would result in unwanted conver‑
sion of debt.
The motives for using convertibles as a substitute for common stock was first 
confirmed in the mid–1950s (Pilcher, 1955). Similar findings were then bore out 
in more actual research concerning the American and the European market (Bill‑
ingsley, Smith, 1996; Graham, Harvey, 2001; Bancel, Mittoo, 2004a; 2004b; Brou‑
nen, de Jong, Koedijk, 2006; Drobetz, Grüninger, Wöhle, 2006) in which compa‑
nies issue convertible debt to circumvent a short‑term equity dilution and to avoid 
a sale of undervalued shares. At the same time, many firms perceive convertible 
bonds as an alternative for straight debt which helps them benefit from a tax shield 
and decrease debt coupons compared to ordinary corporate bonds. Nevertheless, 
this motivation seems to be slightly less popular than treating convertibles as a de‑
layed equity.
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3. Sample description and methodology
The research sample encompasses the issues of straight, callable and putable con‑
vertibles carried out between 2004 and 2014 by service and manufacturing compa‑
nies from the United States, Europe (Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and 
France) and Asia (Japan, China and Hong Kong). In order to grasp the potential rea‑
sons for using high premium convertibles, the sample was divided into two groups: 
the first contains 128 issues of convertible debt with a high initial conversion pre‑
mium (higher than 40 percent), hereafter HP/CBs. The second consists of 172 is‑
sues of low premium convertibles (conversion premium lower than 20 percent), 
hereafter LP/CBs. All zero‑coupon convertibles have been excluded from the re‑
search (as they are used mostly for tax purposes, not analyzed in this paper) as well 
as all exchangeable bonds which belong to a different type of hybrid debt that 
can be exchanged for the stock of a firm other than the issuer. Together these two 
groups comprise a final sample totaling 300 issues of convertible bonds, of which 
241 were conducted by American, 30 by European and 29 by Asian companies. 
The initial data for this analysis was sourced from the Bloomberg Database.
The verification of the main hypothesis was conducted based on 10 proxies for 
financial performance of hybrid debt issuers. All indicators were collected from the 
most recent annual financial reports from the last year preceding the convertible 
issue. They describe firms’ leverage (“Debt/Assets”, “Debt/Equity”), profitability 
(“Net margin”, “ROA”, “ROE”), liquidity (“Financial slack”1, “EBITDA/Interest”), 
growth opportunities (“Tobin’s Q Ratio”) and costs of raising capital (“WACC Cost 
of Equity”, “WACC Cost of Debt after tax”).These indicators are commonly used 
in the research concerning a hybrid debt financing to make a comprehensive as‑
sessment of economic situation of the issuers.
In the first part of the research, descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard 
deviation) and statistical significance tests (Mann‑Whitney U test) are used in order 
to analyze a financial situation of the issuers of both HP/CBs and LP/CBs. There‑
after, several logistic regression models are employed to indicate the set of fac‑
tors which may determine the issuance of HP/CBs across different continents.
4. Research results and discussion
The analysis starts with the examination of 10 proxies for financial performance 
of the HP/CBs and LP/CBs issuers from the U. S., Europe and Asia. Due to strong 
divergences from a normal distribution, the expected values of all analyzed indi‑
cators are closer to their median rather than to their mean values (Table 1). The 
1 Financial slack is calculated as cash plus liquid assets divided by total assets.
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results show that the HP/CBs and the LP/CBs issuers differ from each other statis‑
tically in terms of only a few parameters, but a closer look at the outcomes leads 
to some important findings.
Table 1. Proxies for financial performance of the HP/CBs and LP/CBs issuers
Variable
Conver-
tible 
Type
USA Europe Asia
n Median p-value n Median p-value n Median p-value
Debt/Assets
LP/CBs 144 0.491
0.299
10 0.614
0.538
18 0.564
0.893
HP/CBs 97 0.547 20 0.501 11 0.489
Debt/ 
Equity
LP/CBs 130 0.900
0.122
10 1.628
0.383
18 1.299
0.893
HP/CBs 90 1.164 19 0.848 11 0.956
Financial 
slack
LP/CBs 144 0.183
0.214
10 0.080
0.071*
18 0.147
0.080*
HP/CBs 97 0.181 20 0.208 11 0.254
EBITDA/
Interest
LP/CBs 117 4.094
0.015**
7 7.252
0.583
16 7.130
0.292
HP/CBs 84 3.010 19 6.260 10 3.703
Net margin
LP/CBs 140 0.016
< 0.0001***
10 0.067
0.003***
18 0.042
0.504
HP/CBs 97 –0.083 20 –0.033 9 0.009
ROA
LP/CBs 143 0.015
0.002***
10 0.034
0.015**
18 0.020
0.072*
HP/CBs 97 –0.064 20 –0.025 11 0.004
ROE
LP/CBs 143 0.078
0.001***
10 0.097
0.006***
18 0.051
0.025**
HP/CBs 96 –0.099 20 –0.082 11 0.015
Q Ratio
LP/CBs 120 1.968
0.293
6 1.197
0.109
18 1.074
0.590
HP/CBs 68 1.789 18 1.492 11 1.104
WACC 
Cost  
of Equity
LP/CBs 144 9.544
0.963
10 9.765
0.011**
18 8.116
0.065*
HP/CBs 93 9.513 19 10.887 11 10.228
WACC 
Cost 
of Debt
LP/CBs 144 2.416
0.242
10 0.915
0.142
18 0.419
0.007***
HP/CBs 94 2.637 19 0.836 11 0.258
p‑value – the probability of the Mann‑Whitney U test 
* significant at the α = 0.1 
** significant at the 0.05 level 
*** significant at the 0.01 level.
Source: own elaboration
First, the HP/CBs issuers from the U. S. are much less profitable than the com‑
panies that issue LP/CBs (Net margin = –8.3% to 1.6%, ROA = –6.4% to 1.5%, 
ROE = –9.9% to 7.8%), slightly more leveraged (Debt/Assets = 54.7% to 49.1%, 
Debt/Equity = 1.2 to 0.9; differences statistically non‑significant) and with no li‑
quidity problems (EBITDA/Interest close to 3, Financial slack = 18.1%). The Q 
Ratio of more than 1 (exactly between 1.8–2.0) suggests that the issuers of HP/
CBs and LP/CBs may be engaged in investment process and thus searching for 
capital to finance their new projects (differences statistically non‑significant). Fur‑
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thermore, it seems that all companies bear similar costs of raising equity and debt 
capital (9.5% and 2.5% respectively; differences statistically non‑significant).
The HP/CBs issuers from Europe are much less profitable in comparison 
to the issuers of LP/CBs (Net margin = –3.3% to 3.4%, ROA = –2.5% to 3.4%, 
ROE = –8.2% to 9.7%), less indebted (Debt/Assets = 50.1% to 61.4%, Debt/Eq‑
uity = 0.8 to 1.6; differences statistically non‑significant) and not at risk of losing 
liquidity (Financial slack = 20.8% to 8.0%, EBITDA/Interest = 6.2 to 7.2). The 
values of the Q Ratio (1.5 to 1.2; differences statistically non‑significant) indicate 
that at the moment of hybrid debt issuance, the HP/CBs issuers are more engaged 
in carrying out new investment projects than the firms that issue LB/CBs and 
thus they may use convertible bonds to finance their investment process. Moreo‑
ver, the cost of equity is about one percentage point higher for the HP/CBs issu‑
ers (10.9% to 9.8%; differences statistically non‑significant), but the cost of debt 
remains at a similar level for both groups of firms (0.9% to 0.8%; differences sta‑
tistically non‑significant).
The issuers of HP/CBs from Asia are characterized by a relatively safe capital 
structure (Debt/Equity = 0.96 to 1.3 for the LP/CBs issuers; Debt/Assets = 48.9% 
to 56.4%; differences statistically non‑significant), but they seem to underper‑
form compared to the companies issuing LP/CBs (Net margin = 0.9% to 4.2%, 
ROA = 0.4% to 2.0%, ROE = 1.5% to 5.1%). It is highly probable that at the moment 
of convertibles issuance, all analyzed Asian companies are not engaged in an in‑
vestment process on a large scale (Q Ratio of about 1.1; differences statistically 
non‑significant). It also appears that the issuers of HP/CBs raise equity at a higher 
cost (WACC Cost of Equity = 10.2% to 8.1% for the LP/CBs’ issuers), but the cost 
of raising debt is nearly equal (WACC Cost of Debt = 0.3% to 0.4%).
In the second part of the research, logistic regression models were used in or‑
der to estimate the probability of using HP/CBs by manufacturing and service 
companies. It turns out that the cost of equity and the cost of debt have the biggest 
impact on the choice of convertibles with higher‑than‑average conversion premi‑
um among all considered factors (Table 2)2.
As for American companies, under ceteris paribus assumption, if the cost 
of equity rises by one percentage point, the probability that a firm issues HP/CBs 
increases by ca. 12%. Moreover, a raise of Q Ratio by 1 increases a likelihood 
of choosing high premium convertibles by ca. 66%. It may suggest that American 
firms issue bonds with a relatively high conversion price to finance their new in‑
2 Ten independent variables were used in the models: (1) Debt/Assets, (2) Debt/Equity, (3) Fi‑
nancial Slack, (4) EBITDA/Interests, (5) Net margin, (6) ROA, (7) ROE, (8) Q Ratio, (9) WACC 
Cost of Equity, (10) WACC Cost of Debt. The estimated models have a relatively high discrimina‑
tory power. They correctly classify 88.8% of LP/CBs and 31.5% of HP/CBs issued by the Ameri‑
can companies (it predicts overall 65.7% of issues), 66.7% and 94.1% for the European companies 
(87.0% for the whole model), 94.4% and 88.9% for the Asian companies (92.6% for the whole model).
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vestment options: if they turn out to be profitable and thus increasing companies’ 
market capitalization, it encourages bondholders to exercise a conversion option 
embedded in convertible bonds.
Table 2. The results of logistic regression for the issuance of HP/CBs
Variable B S(B) Wald Statistic p-value exp(B) R2Nag n
1: USA
Financial Slack –0.567 0.290 3.816 0.051* 0.567
0.213 241
Q Ratio 0.508 0.145 12.301 < 0.0001*** 1.662
WACC Cost of Equity 0.114 0.058 3.934 0.047** 1.121
Constant –2.553 0.719 12.599 < 0.0001*** 0.078
2: Europe
WACC Cost of Equity 0.649 0.276 5.517 0.019** 1.913
0.605 30WACC Cost of Debt –2.025 1.095 3.420 0.064* 0.132
Constant –2.944 2.429 1.469 0.225 0.053
3: Asia
WACC Cost of Equity 1.281 0.645 3.943 0.047** 3.601
0.809 29WACC Cost of Debt –24.799 13.639 3.306 0.069* 0.000
Constant –2.974 4.799 0.384 0.535 0.051
B – the non‑standardized regression coefficient 
S(B) – coefficient B estimation error B 
R2Nag – Nagelkerke R‑square 
* significant at the α = 0.1 
** significant at the 0.05 level 
*** significant at the 0.01 level.
Source: own elaboration
It should be noted that the results for “financial slack” are not consistent with 
the outcomes obtained from the descriptive statistics. In the regression model, the 
higher the level of liquidity, the lesser the probability of issuing HP/CBs. Accord‑
ing to the descriptive statistics in turn, a median for “financial slack” is quite high 
and similar for both the HP/CBs’ and the LP/CBs’ issuers (amounts to 18%). How‑
ever, if we take another proxy for firms’ liquidity into account, namely “EBITDA/
Interest”, which for the HP/CBs issuers stands at 3, there might be evidence that 
these firms should not face any difficulties in debt repayment; hence, the problem 
of issuers’ liquidity is not crucial for further analysis.
The results concerning European companies demonstrate that under ceteris par-
ibus assumption, a rise of the cost of equity by one percentage point increases the 
probability of HP/CBs issuance by ca. 91% and an increase of the cost of debt by one 
percentage point decreases a chance of issuing these bonds by ca. 87%. The analy‑
sis of Asian firms leads to similar findings. In their case, a rise of the cost of equity 
by one percentage point increases a likelihood of issuing HP/CBs by ca. 360% and the 
same change of cost of debt results in decreasing this probability by ca. 100%.
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To sum up, it seems that a decision to use HP/CBs by firms from the U. S., 
Europe and Asia is influenced mostly by the cost of raising equity: the higher 
it is, the higher the initial conversion premium of newly issued convertibles set 
by the issuers. This may suggest that, in accordance with the concepts of Stein 
(1992) and Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2001), companies perceive convertible 
debt financing mainly as a substitute for equity capital rather than an alternative 
for straight debt. A necessity to avoid issuing new shares perhaps arises from 
their high financial and operating risk. This might be reflected by the beta in the 
CAPM model that increases the cost of raising equity by companies. By issuing 
convertible bonds, they get a chance to avoid selling undervalued common stock 
and to increase equity capital thereafter under more favorable conditions (at about 
40–80% higher price and at a lower dilution). These findings are consistent with 
Billingsley and Smith (1996), Graham and Harvey (2001) and Bancel and Mit‑
too (2004a; 2004b).
A negative or very low profitability of the American, European and Asian 
companies provides some evidence that all issuers of high premium bonds may 
be strongly undervalued. However, these firms are able to raise additional debt due 
to their moderate leverage and lack of liquidity problems. This may facilitate the 
HP/CB issuers to attract external investors to buy convertibles which gives them 
an opportunity to become their shareholders in the future.
The results of logistic regression models indicate that the higher the cost 
of debt, the less probable the issuance of HP/CBs is. This means that convert‑
ibles with a high conversion premium are not likely to be used by firms to re‑
duce the cost of debt service. This role perhaps falls to LP/CBs. Such bonds can 
be issued by companies in two cases: First, if they want to economize on a rel‑
atively lower coupon compared to ordinary bonds, but on the other hand fixing 
a lower premium makes debt conversion more probable; and secondly, if they 
are willing to raise cheap convertible debt when they are overvalued. In this 
case they misleadingly settle a lower‑than‑average conversion premium to at‑
tract potential investors to buy hybrid debt, but with a full awareness that a con‑
version option will never become in‑the‑money. However, such dubious strategy 
may ruin their good relations with the market and negatively influence future 
issues of any securities.
Moreover, if Tobin’s Q is close to 2 for the HP/CBs issuers and the results 
of logistic regression indicate that this parameter is one of three factors that impact 
managers’ decision to issue HP/CBs, it may suggest that firms from the U. S. are 
likely to use high premium hybrid debt to finance their new investments. Managers 
expect that these projects will boost companies’ financial results, which increases 
a probability of debt conversion and thus gives them a chance to undertake fur‑
ther investment options. This approach is consistent with the sequential financing 
concept of Mayers (1998).
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It should also be stressed that a number of findings drawn from this research 
needs to be treated with caution. First, statistically significant differences between 
the HP/CBs and LP/CBs issuers were observed in terms of only a few parame‑
ters (e.g., profitability and cost of capital). Second, some differences are statis‑
tically significant at a relatively low significance level (e.g., liquidity). Further‑
more, the research sample concerning the issues carried out by the European and 
Asian companies is relatively small (about 30 issues) compared to issues carried 
out by the American firms (241 issues). It is also questionable whether the results 
obtained from the analysis can be comparable across markets from three differ‑
ent continents.
5. Conclusions
The motives for the issuance of convertible bonds have been examined for more 
than seventy years. However, little attention has been paid to problems of converti‑
ble design, such as the question of initial conversion premium. The purpose of this 
article was to identify the reasons for using convertibles with a higher‑than‑aver‑
age conversion premium. Using a sample of 300 convertible issues carried out be‑
tween 2004 and 2014 by manufacturing and service companies from the United 
States, Europe and Asia, it was shown that in all analyzed markets high premium 
hybrid debt is used as a substitute for common stock rather than for straight debt. 
A deep undervaluation of companies due to their poor financial performance may 
incite managers to delay increasing equity capital and to look for an alternative 
source of funds. The issuance of high premium convertibles enables corporations 
to raise equity at a later time under more favorable conditions. It is possible that 
some firms use convertible debt to finance their new investment projects which 
will improve their weak financial results.
The problem of initial conversion premium in hybrid debt financing needs 
a further examination. The future research should verify whether, consistent with 
the findings from this article, issuers of high premium convertible bonds do en‑
hance their financial results following debt issuance. Another scope of review may 
concentrate on the announcement effect of convertibles. Assuming that issuers sell 
high premium bonds when they are undervalued, one should check whether or not 
the market reacts positively to the information that a company is about to issue 
such designed instruments.
206 Damian Kaźmierczak
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Dlaczego przedsiębiorstwa emitują obligacje zamienne z wysoką początkową premią 
konwersji?
Streszczenie: Celem artykułu jest identyfikacja przyczyn emisji obligacji zamiennych z wysoką po‑
czątkową premią konwersji. Analiza trzystu emisji długu zamiennego przeprowadzonych w latach 
2004–2014 przez spółki ze Stanów Zjednoczonych, Europy i Azji działające w sektorze produkcyjnym 
i usługowym wykazała, że obligacje zamienne z wysoką premią konwersji są wykorzystywane przez 
niedowartościowane przedsiębiorstwa znajdujące się w trudnej sytuacji finansowej, które traktują 
dług zamienny bardziej jako alternatywę dla emisji akcji niż dla zwykłych obligacji korporacyjnych 
bez wbudowanej opcji konwersji. Emisja obligacji zamiennych najprawdopodobniej ma pozwolić 
tym spółkom na podniesienie kapitału własnego w późniejszym czasie i na dużo lepszych warunkach 
w porównaniu z publiczną emisją akcji.
Słowa kluczowe: finanse przedsiębiorstw, finansowanie długiem, obligacje zamienne, początko‑
wa premia konwersji
JEL: G15, G23, G32
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